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COST AND COVERAGE OF
INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE
LIFE insurance is necessary financial protection for people in lower income
brackets.1 It offers not only family security in the event of the breadwinner's
unfimely death, but also a convenient method of building and investing
savings.2 Not all types of life insurance, however, are within the reach of
low-income earners. To obtain ordinary life insurance, they must purchase
a ,policy with a face amount of at least a thousand dollars.3 Often they
cannot meet minimum premium payments.4 Insurance coverage that can be
bought in lesser face amounts and paid for with smaller premiums has a
natural appeal to this income group.5
Industrial life insurance 6 has tapped this market. Policies can be pur-
chased in any amount less than a thousand dollars; the average policy today
has a face value of 300 dollars.7 Unlike premium payments in ordinary life
1. DAVIS, INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1944) [hereafter
cited as DAVIS]; MASON, TEE BRANDEIS WAY 286 (1938).
2. See HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE 13-35 (1925) for an analysis of the family and
personal uses of life insurance. The savings and investment function of life insurance is
most clearly demonstrated by the purchase of endowment policies. VANCE, INSURANCE
32 (3d ed. 1951) ; MEHR & OSLER, MODERN LIFE INSURANCE 61-66 (1949). An endow-
ment policy, in addition to coverage in the event of earlier death, provides the insured
with the face value of the policy at a given maturity date. MACLEAN, LIF IusuRA ic
44-50 (1935). For further analsyis of life insurance as an investment, see Timberg,
Insurance and Interstate Commnerce, 50 YALE L.J. 959, 978-94 (1941). Policy loans
further demonstrate the savings function of a life insurance policy. The policyholder
may borrow from the insurer at a specified rate of interest a sum of money equal to the
cash surrender value of the policy. The policy is security for the loan. The loan need not
be repaid during the life of the insured. VANCE, INSURANCE 644-5 (3d ed. 1951).
3. DAVIs at 5-6. Some companies offer ordinary life insurance at face values as low
as $500. Id. at 12.
4. Most ordinary life insurers require a ten dollar minimum premium payment.
DAVIS at 12. Wage earners covered by group insurance have no problem meeting
premium payments, for employers pay a substantial part of the premium. For the extent
to which low-income workers are covered by group insurance, see pages 71-2 infra.
5. DAVIS at 4-7.
6. Industrial life insurance, often called weekly premium life insurance, takes its
name from the industrial workers who typically are its policyholders. GESELL & HowE,
STUDY OF LEGAL RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 254 (TNEC Monograph 28, 1940).
For historical treatment of industrial life insurance, see TAYLOR, TE SOCIAL COST Ol'
INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE 9-16 (1933) and DRYDEN, ADDRESSES AND PAirRs ON Livr
INSURANCE AND OTHER SUBJECTS 19-43 (1909).
Industrial life insurance is defined in N. Y. INS. LAW § 201 as "that form of life
insurance, either (a) under which the premiums are payable weekly, or, (b) under which
the premiums are payable monthly or oftener, but less often than weekly, if the face
amount ... is less than one thousand dollars and if the words 'industrial policy' arc printed
upon the policy as a part of the descriptive matter."
7. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LimE INSURANCE FACT Boor 22 (1950), [hereafter
cited as Ln INSURANCE FACT Boox (1950)].
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insurance, the small weekly or monthly premium for the industrial policy is
typically collected at the home of the insured by the company's collecting
agent.S Unlike ordinary life insurance, where policy amounts determine
fixed premium charges, industrial life insurance tailors face value to any
premium in a multiple of five cents that the insured wishes to pay.0 Instead
of the medical examination required in ordinary life insurance, most indus-
trial policies are issued on the basis of the soliciting agent's recommendation 10
and the applicant's own statements as to his medical history and present
condition of health."
Industrial insurance is big business today. 109 million policies are in force
in the United States.'- One insurer alone furnishes ten billion dollars worth
of industrial life insurance coverage.13 In the single year 1949, 212 million
8. MEHR & OsLEa, Momma LuE I.-sm .cn 189 (1949).
9. DAvis at 6-7. TAYLO.R, THE SOCIAL COST Or I::orsTrhLuL L:surr:acz 23 (1933).
10. The agent's recommendation is presumably based not only on the questions and
answers in the application and his observation of the applicant, but on an informal
investigation of the living conditions in the applicant's home, his and his family's general
health, his occupation, and information furnihed by his neighbors or cmployer5. D.AIs
at 107-9. Most industrial applications require the agent to state his personal opinion of the
insurability of the proposed risk. See, e.g., Part D of Metropolitan application form,
id. at 105.
11. For a sample of questions asked, see application form of the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company, reprinted in DAvis at 104-5.
Another distinctive feature of the industrial life insurance policy is the "facility-of-
payment" clause, designed to facilitate immediate payment of death benefits. Under it,
the named beneficiary in the policy must file a claim within thirty or si-:ty days after
the insured's death in order to preserve a vested interest in the proceeds. If the claim is
not filed within the time specified in the policy, or if the beneficiary predeceases the
insured, or is a minor or incompetent, the insurer has the right to pay the proceeds to a
relative by blood or marriage, or under some policies to any person it deems equitably
entitled to them. Possible recipients are friends, relatives, or persons who have incurred
expenses in behalf of the insured. See cases collected in Note, The Facility of Payl"nent
Cla2use, 166 A.L.R. 10 (1947). During the twenties and thirties, the clause vas a constant
source of litigation and often a source of insurers' abuse. See Fuller, The Spcdil Nature
of the Wage-Earmer's Life Insurance Problem, 2 LAw & CoSlu,. Pnoe., 10, 29 at scq.
(1935). The typical abuse caused by payment to undeserving persons has been largely
corrected by giving the named beneficiary a vested interest for thirty or skxty days from
death of the insured. But since many industrial beneficiaries may be unaware of their
rights, the shortness of the period may still produce harsh results.
12. L= INsuRANcE FACt' Boo 23 (1950). There are approimately 65 million
ordinary life insurance policies in force. Id. at 19. Since many industrial policyholders
own two or more policies, it is difficult to ascertain the e-mct number of individual policy-
holders. In 1943, there were 50 million. DAvIs at 3. Today the number is probably closer
to 60 million.
13. Communication to the Y.ux LAw JOURNAL from Malin :. Davis, Actuary of
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, dated July 17, 1951, in Yale Law Library.
This is appro-dmately one third of all industrial insurance in force in the United States.
Three companies, Metropolitan, Prudential and John Hancock furnish about three-
fourths of all industrial insurance coverage. D.vis at 6.
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dollars were paid out in death benefits. 14 An army of agents solicits sales and
collects premiums. And each year's business is greater than last.'5
For all its present vigor, industrial life insurance has had a checkered pabt.
As early as 1906, Louis D. Brandeis pointed to grave abuses in the cost struc-
ture and selling practices of industrial insurers."; Others raised sporadic
protests for the next thirty years. 17 Individual efforts culminated in the TNEC
life insurance investigation in 1938. Summarizing exhaustive hearings and
field investigation into all aspects of industrial life insurance, two monographs
laid bare a long list of defects-enormous expense, low benefits, and high lapse
rates for the insured; and predatory selling practices and huge profits for the
insurers.' Public reaction was aroused. Companies began to improve policy
provisions, cost factors, and selling practices. 19 State legislatures began hear.
ings and enactment of regulations.2 0 But before reform had gathered monen-
tum, the upward swing of the business cycle obscured the need. War produc-
tion began-soon a boom was on-and public attention was diverted.
THE HIGH COST OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE
The enormous cost of industrial insurance coverage is its most outstanding
defect.21 The actual money costs of any given policy are small because face
values are low. 22  But per dollar of coverage, industrial insurance is vastly
14. LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 22 (1950).
15. See table of amounts of industrial insurance in force by years in LIFE INSURANCE
FACT BooK 23 (1950). Since 1940, the yearly increase in industrial insurance in force ha"
ranged from a minimum of approximately 400 million to over two billion dollars. Ibd,
16. The results of his findings were published in Brandeis, Wage-Earners' Life
Insurance, COnIER's, Vol. 37, No. 25 (1906), reprinted in MASON, THE BRANDEIS WAY
311 (1938).
17. See, e.g., TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE (1933).
18. DAVENPORT & GESELL, FAMILIES AND THEIR LIFE INSURANCE (TNEC Mono-
graph 2, 1940) ; GESELL & HOWE, STUDY OF LEGAL RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE COM'ANIS
248-305 (TNEC Monograph 28, 1940).
19. Reforms included (1) earlier non-forfeiture benefits, DAVIS at 8-9, (2) restricting
the operation of the facility of payment clause, see note 11, supra, (3) compensation to
encourage sales of lasting policies, DAVIS at 225; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No.
688, OPERATION OF SAVINGS-BANK LIFE INSURANCE IN MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW
YORK, 36 (1941) [Hereafter cited as BULLETIN No. 6881, (4) granting of direct
payment premium discounts and reductions for monthly payment of premiunIv, see
page 51 infra.
20. See pages 70-1 infra for some of the legislative results.
21. See Brandeis, op. cit. supra note 16; TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL
INSURANCE 160 (1933); MASON, THE BRANDEIS WAY 286-7 (1938); GESELL & HOwIV,
STUDY OF LEGAL RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 283-9, 303-5 (TNEC Mono-
graph 28, 1940). The TNEC noted that cost had changed little since 1905. Id. at 305.
Between 1940 and the present, the yearly cost of protection has been lowered about 17
per cent.* Compare figures in BULLETIN No. 688 at 54 with figures in table on page 49
infra.
22. For example, a $276 industrial policy may cost as little as twenty cents per
week in premiums. BULLETIN No. 688 at 54.
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more expensive than any comparable form of insurance. Comparison with
Savings Bank 3 and ordinary life insurance strikingly demonstrates the high
cost of an industrial policy. Costs are most fairly and effectively compared
on the basis of average yearly cost of protection. - 4  Premiums paid over a
period of years, less dividends received and accrued cash surrender value,
when divided by the number of years, yields the yearly net cost for comparison
purposes. The following table, computed on this basis for a ten year period,
compares the cost of industrial with an equal amount of Savings Bank life
and ordinary life insurance coverage .
2 5
Premiums Net YcarIy .et
Paid Cost Cost
Savings Bank Life Insurance 252.40 27.37 2.74
(Averages of Mass. Banks)
Ordinary Life Insurance 277.40 60.49 605
(Average of two insurers)
Industrial Life Insurance 392.60 169.40 16.94
(Average of same two insurers) I
(Based on $1000 straight life policy-age 35-- 1951 Rates, Dividends & Cash Values)
23. See note 164 infra for description of Savings Bank Life Insurance.
24. BULLETIn No. 688 at 50-51 : TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL INURfAsNT
176-77 (1933).
25. The table is based on figures in MAssA cHUsrrs S.v[ws BA.NI: Lir. I:FsFm-
ANCE COUNCIL, CHECK THE SAVINGS (1951). For similar 1941 comparatihe costs,
see BuLLErhx No. 688 at 50-55. In making the comparison, several factors must be
considered. Industrial policies, unlike Savings Bank policies. provide di.ability benefits
and double indemnity for accidental death. Ordinary policies may include these features,
but usually at extra cost. BuLLErxx No. 69 at 42-3. But the disability benefits of an
industrial policy are narrow. They are payable only for a total and permanent loss
of sight, loss of both hands or both feet, or one hand and one foot. DAVws at 192.
In addition, the table was compiled before Savings Bank insurers were subject to
the federal income tax. INr. R V. CODE § 101(2). Under the Revenue Act of 1951,
a Savings Bank authorized to conduct a life insurance business is taxed on its insurance
business at the same rate as life insurance companies. Revenue Act of 1951, § 313-a,
20 U.S.L. IV= 29, 48 (U.S. October 23, 1951); RrEsrc=H IN:sTiTUTE or A-x-=cA,
RE EL-uE Acr oF 1951, 55 (1951). However, the tax exemption prior to 1951 and the
exemption from state insurance department fees, BULLETIN No. 038 at 58-t2, contitutcd
an insignificant difference in operating costs. As of 1941, for example, the insurance
companies paid about 2 per cent of their premium income in taxes and flts, while
Banks paid about 7 ' of 1 per cent. BtTLLETi. No. 6,S at 62.
A third factor relevant to the comparison is the differing methods of premium
payment in industrial and ordinary insurance. Industrial payments are veely and
current, while ordinary are at least quarterly and often semiannually or annually, and
are payable in advance. The ordinary insurer has at the beginning of an invcbtment
period a comparatively larger sum of cash to invest. In this way, more favorable
investment returns may result.
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The cost of an insurance policy is a function of three factors-mortality,
rate of return on the insurer's investments, and loading or operating ex-
penses.23  Since investment opportunities are presumably equally favorable
for insurers of comparable size,27 the higher cost of industrial insurance pe r
dollar of coverage must be the result of the other two factors. The mortality
rate of industrial policyholders is indeed 20 per cent higher than that of ordin-
ary life insurance policyholders. 28 But since industrial costs almost threl,
times as much as ordinary, a small part of the cost differential is traceable to
this factor. Loading expenses-sales and collection commissions, administra.
tive and bookkeeping expenditures, and lapse costs-account for the bulk.20
Sales and Collection Costs
To push sales of new policies, industrial insurers pay their agents a promo-
tional first year commission amounting to twenty to forty per cent of the first
year premiums.30 Other insurers pay a commission based on the weekly or
quarterly net increase of premiums collected. 31  Premiums not only reflect
these sales commissions, but also include continuous commissions on the
agent's weekly collectionsA2 The clerical and administrative cost of 52 rather
26. TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE 161 (1933); MACI EAN,
Lim INSUANCE 93 (1935).
27. Companies which transact both ordinary and industrial life insurance combine
funds for investment. DAvis at 122. Interest earned on policy loans to ordinary
insurance policyholders is credited to that branch exclusively. Rarely are loans granted
to industrial policyholders. Ibid.
28. In 1940-41 mortality among industrial policyholders was 120 per cent of that
among ordinary policyholders. DAvis at 119.
29. GESELL & HOWE, STUDY OF LEGAL RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE ComANiES 287-89
(TNEC Monograph 28, 1940); BULLETIN No. 688 at 57; MEHR & OSLER, MODrRN Ln.r
INSURANCE 202-4 (1949). In 1939, for example, the ratio of salaries and commissions
to premium income of four companies selling industrial insurance was more than twice
as high as the same ratio in the same companies on sales of ordinary policies. BULLETIN
No. 688, table at 57.
30. DAviS at 66-7. See note 31 infra.
31. See GESELL & HowE, STUDY OF LEGAL RESERVE LIF INSURANCE COMPA¢IES
255-58 (TNEC Monograph 28, 1940). More recent information was obtained by a
questionnaire sent to thirty industrial insurers in the United States. Fourteen replies
were received. Represented were (a) smaller Southern insurers, (b) insurers with more
than 100 million dollars of insurance in force, and (c) two of the three larger insurers,
those with over a billion dollars of insurance in force. The various questionnaires
[hereafter cited as Questionnaire] are on file in Yale Law Library.
The questionnaires indicated two methods of compensation for sales of new policies.
Some insurers base compensation on the weekly net increase in premiums paid and
collected. The commission is equal to the net increase in the amount of premiums,
multiplied twenty or thirty times. Other insurers pay a percentage-ranging from
twenty to forty per cent and averaging thirty-five per cent-of the premiums paid in the
first year of the policy.
32. Never less than 12 per cent of the premium collected weekly was allocated to
the agent's collection commission. Some insurers pay as high as 25 per cent of the
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than 12 or 4 collection transactions increases district office expense. Taken
together and averaged over a normal life insurance span, these loading factrs
substantially increase the cost of an industrial insurance policy.
Some insurers offer to policyholders several cheaper alternative forms of
insurance and methods of payment. Ordinary life insurance may be available
on a monthly-payment basis for policies of $1000 or more face value. On
industrial policies, some insurers give a ten percent rebate if premiums are
paid directly to the branch office and a reduction in premiums when they are
collected on a monthly basis.33  No company, however, offers greater reduc-
tions for a combination of monthly-directly paid premiums, and many com-
panies offer neither monthly ordinary life nor cheaper methods of industrial
premium payments.34  Where the company does offer the direct payment
discount, it is often buried in legalistically worded policy provisions likely to
be overlooked. 35 Monthly payment discounts are not advertised in the appli-
cation or policy at all. The agent is an unlikely proselytizer, for any savings
to the policyholder are almost a total loss to the agent.30 Rarely encouraged
premium. As a general rule, the smaller the insurer, the larger the collection c,.,mmissin.
Questionnaire. See also Gr~sE.m & Howv, op. cit. supra note 31, at 256 nAO.
33. DAvis at 146. To obtain the rebate, the policyholder must pay premiums to the
branch office for 52 consecutive weeks. At the end of the year, the company refunds
ten per cent of the total premiums paid. An alternative method gives 52 weeks credit for
47 direct payments. Questionnaire.
34. Questionnaire. See also, D.Ais at 266. Of thirty-one companies Davis lists,
only 9 gave direct payment discounts. Some states require companies chartercd or
doing business within the state to offer the direct payment discount. See e.g., N.Y. I'-s.
LAw § 163(1) (k).
35. For example, the policy of one large industrial insurer informs the policyholder
of the direct payment rebate thus: "If, while premiums are not in default beyond the
grace period, notice is given to any office of the Company xhich maintains an account
for receiving direct payment of premiums, that premium will in future be paid directly
to such an office, and if premiums are so paid continuonsly for a pericd of one year
without default beyond the grace period, the Company will, at the end of such year,
refund 10 per cent of the total of the year's premiums so paid...."
36. When an agent sells monthly ordinary life insurance, his sales commission is
identical with weekly or monthly industrial. DAvis at 67. But his collection commis-
sion is smaller, usually only five per cent of the size of the premium. II Id. Industrial
insurers were asked in the Questionnaire, supra note 31, how much larger over a twenty-
year period the agent's total compensation would be on a weekly industrial policy than
on an ordinary policy of identical size and type of coverage. One large insurer estimated
that compensation on weekly industrial would be "seven per cent of the size of the
premium" higher than for monthly ordinary. Other insurers estimated that the total
compensation on weekly industrial would be from 50 to 75 per cent larger on the
ordinary policy over the twenty year period.
When a policyholder pays premiums directly to an office of the insurer, the agent
loses the entire collection commission. Since collection commissions constitute approd-
mately 40 per cent of the agent's total weekly income, D.avis at 69, encouraging direct
payments is obviously not in his financial interest.
See also TAY'Lor, THE SocI COST OF INDUsTRIAL INSLNcu 172 (1933); Gr-.q
& HoWE, op. cit. supra, note 32, at 256 n.47, 289.
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to take advantage of these savings, policyholders continue to rely on the agent's
weekly collection of industrial premiums.
37
But the need for weekly home collections is illusory. Low-income families
are capable of saving for monthly premiums and taking the minimum affirnia-
tive action necessary to pay directly to a branch office.38 They pay utility
bills this way. Industrial policyholders' reliance on weekly home collection
is due more to ignorance of available savings than inability to take advantage
of them.3 9 Many- who do know of the savings may, without advice, fail to
appreciate their significance. So long as home collection conveniently exists
and the agent encourages it, policyholders tend to rely on the service. Never-
theless, a growing number of policyholders utilize direct and monthly payment
savings.40 There is no reason to suppose they are atypical. And once policy.
holders take advantage of the discount, experience of the insurers indicates,
they maintain payments on this basis.41
To reduce collection and handling costs, wasteful and largely unneeded
weekly home collections should be eliminated. 42  Other incentives can relieve
37. The percentages of policyholders paying weekly collected premiums in two of
the three larger insurers were 78.6 and 43.3 per cent respectively. Data on the third
was unavailable. Questionnaire.
38. In 1933, a depression year, one thoughtful observer wrote: "There is growing
evidence of the increased ability of people... to attend to payment themselves... to
put money by for intervals longer than one week ... to look ahead much further than
[their] father or grandfather did or could." TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL COST OF INDtUSTRIAL
LIFE INSURANCE 168 (1933). Present economic conditions can only reinforce this belief.
But see DAVIS at 52-3: "The small size of Industrial premiums and the frequency
with which they are payable make the...method of mailing premiums directly to the
company impractical. The average weekly premium per family in one large company
is 69 cents.... Most [policyholders] have no checking accounts, and it would be highly
inconvenient for them to mail these small sums directly to the company. The cost of
postage alone ... would in many cases be greater than the cost of having an agent call
to receive the premiums.... [M]any policyholders do not live or work in the immediate
vicinity of [branch] offices. For them to make payments personally would usually cost
carfare. ... But this argumnent proves too much. If the average family's insurance
costs are so low as 69 cents per week, policyholders in the family could manifestly pay
on a monthly basis, directly or by collection.
39. See DAVENPORT & GESELL, FAMILIES AND THEIR LIFE INSURANcE 54 (TNEC
Monograph 2, 1940).
40. In 1940, twenty-eight per cent of one large insurer's weekly industrial premilums
were paid directly to the branch office. GESELL & HOWE, STUDY OF LcAL REsEItv; Lit
INSURANCE COMPANIES 256 (TNEC Monograph 28, 1940). Today, in the same company,
almost one third of the weekly industrial premiums are paid directly. Questionnaire.
See also DAVIS at 15 for a chart demonstrating the increasing utilization of monthly
premium and direct payment discounts. In view of the limited means by which policy-
holders learn of the savings, pages 51-2 supra, the development is impressive.
41. For example, every insurer offering direct payment discounts replied that once it
policyholder utilized the saving, he continued payment on the same basis, Questionnaire.
42. "By the elimination of the agent's collection function, the greatest part of the
expense [of industrial insurance] would be saved. Fewer agents would be necessary,
because not nearly so many men would be required to solicit new business. Less business
[Vol. 61:,46
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pressures now inducing agents to discourage cost-saving forms of insurance
and methods of payment. For example, a greater bulk of the agent's compen-
sation could be based on the face value of non-lapsed insurance sold rather
than on current or past premium collections.4 3 Moreover, all insurers might
at least equalize sales commissions on industrial with monthly-ordinary sales
commissions. 44 In this way the desirable incentive to sell and maintain insur-
ance is kept, but the agent no longer has a monetary interest in pushing higher-
premium insurance or costlier payment plans.
Aside from elimination of high-cost factors and agents' undesirable selling
methods, all insurers could more directly encourage policyholders tu utilize
cost-saving payment plans and alternative forms of insurance coverage. Direct
payment rebptes, monthly payment discounts, and even greater premium re-
ductions for combined monthly-direct paymenits could be offered buth in the
contract and by directly mailed notice to policyholders. 45, And, of course,
simple language should apprise the policyholder of the potential saving.40  To
provide service equivalent to home collection, insurers could contract fur
collection by willing employers through payroll deductions.4  This economical
would very likely be done, but at least an equal amount would be conserved. The
Industrial policyholder should be encouraged to assume more responsibilit- fur the main-
tenance of his insurance, for it is an enervating process. %vhich removes frm him any
mental or physical stimulus in the retention of it. He is in receipt of a service at too
great a cost ... There can be no material change in the cost of Industrial life insurance
until there is a radical revision of the place of the agent in its conduct." TA-YLOrt, Tin
SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL IN sR NcE 172 (1933).
43. Compensation from weekly collection of industrial premiums constitutes 40 to
50 per cent of .the agent's total income. D.vIs at 69. Unless a smaller percentage
of the agent's income is derived from collections, it is unlikely that he will encourage
direct payments of weekly premiums or the purchase of monthly ordinary. If, on the
other hand, compensation were based on face value of a persisting policy regardless of the
type of insurance or method of payment, the agent would encourage tle policyholder to
take the cheapest form of insurance. Establishing a compensation based on face value
equitable to company and agent should not be difficult. Some insurers stated that they
were contemplating such a system. Questionnaire.
44. Some insurers equalize sales commissions today. Questionnaire. See also N. Y.
Izs. LAw § 213-a (7). Under this statute, compensation for sales of industrial policies
cannot be higher than compensation for sales of monthly ordinary policies.
45. If an insurer altered the basis of compensating its agents, pages 52-3 slitra, they
more probably would inform policyholders of direct and monthly payment disc ,,unts. But
directly mailed notice may still be necessary to guarantee widespread lmowledge of the
savings.
46. The legalistic language now used in the policy provision informing policyholders
of the direct payment saving, note 35 supra, doubtless results frum the insurer's desire to
cover all conditions and requirements of the benefit. But the policy provisin and direct
notice need only inform the policyholder that a saving is possible, subject to the insurer's
regulations. When the policyholder seeks to utilize the saving, he can then be informel
of specific conditions and restrictions.
47. The greatest saving to policyholders would be achieved through coverage by an
ordinary policy for which premiums are payable annually. Money for premiums could be
accumulated through weekly deductions, or out of any yearly lonus. Since the employer
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form of "home collection," could materially reduce costs while retaining any
advantages of direct collection. More and better insurance coverage could be
sold for the same price. Finally, conversion to one ordinary life insurance
policy could be facilitated when the aggregate value of any one policyholder's
industrial insurance reaches $1000.48 In this way the expense of collection
and recording for each of several smaller policies in one home could be lowered.
High Lapse Costs.
An unfavorable lapse rate is the second major factor contributing to the
high cost of industrial insurance. 49 An insurance policy lapses when premium
payments cease before non-forfeiture benefits 0 have accrued. For industrial
policies, the non-forfeiture benefits typically accrue after three years.51 But
already has miachinery for withholding part of earnings to pay income taxes, clerical
expense of one more deduction would be minimal. Part of the deducted wage could
compensate the employer for any expense. But it would be substantially less than collec-
tion and handling costs now paid by industrial policyholders.
If the insured cannot afford a thousand dollar ordinary policy, lie may purchase
through payroll deductions a smaller face value industrial policy with premiums payable on
a monthly basis. With the employer making premium payments, however, insurers
could easily offer low-face value industrial policies on a yearly premium plan.
48. In the thirties, many policyholders held more than a thousand dollars aggregate
face value in numerous small weekly premium policies. See example in GESELL & HOWi',
STUDY OF LEGAL RESERVE LiFE INSURANcE COMPANIES 276 (TNEC Monograph 28,
1940). The present extent of such holdings is difficult to ascertain since there are no
recent studies. Some insurers, however, have taken direct steps to discourage multiple
holdings and offer conversion options in policies. DAvis at 41. But since the agent's
compensation from industrial policies exceeds that from an ordinary policy, see note 36
supra, the agent is unlikely to advertise the privilege of conversion. The insurer, there-
fore, should directly notify any policyholder of the potential saving as soon as the size
of his holdings makes him eligible for conversion.
49. Brandeis, Wage Earners' Life Insurance, 1906, reprinted in MAsoi, Tiim
BRANDEIS WAY 311, 315 (1938); TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE
166 (1933); GESELL & HOWE, STUDY OF LEGAL RESERVE INSURANCE CoMPANins 278
et seq. (TNEC Monograph 28, 1940); ME1HR & OSLER, MoDnN LiFE INSURANCE 202
(1949).
50. Non-forfeiture benefits are paid after the policy is in force for a specified period
of years. Three major types of benefits are: (1) Cash surrender valnes. (2) Reduced
paid-up insurance. The face amount of the policy is reduced to that amount of fully
paid-up insurance which the cash surrender would purchase on a single premium plan.
(3) Extended term insurance. The cash surrender value is used as a net single premiun,
to buy term insurance in an amount equal to the face value of the policy for as long a
period of time as the cash value allows. See MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 160-67 (1935);
DAvis at 41-44.
51. Cash surrender values are available after three or five years; reduced paid-up
insurance is typically granted after three or five years; and extended term insurance is
offered after 6 months by larger insurers and after one or three years by smaller insurers.
Chart, DAVIS at 267. See id. at 41-44. Savings Bank policies offer all of tile non-
forfeiture benefits and they are available at earlier dates. See chart in BULLETiNi No. 688
at 42-3. Ordinary life insurance policies likewise provide them earlier. Ibid.
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most lapses actually occur within two or three months of issuance. 2 In the
period 1934-38, total lapsation of industrial policies was approximately eight
times the terminations by death or maturity 3 Lapse rates today are substan-
tially lower,54 due partly to the improved economic conditions and partly to an
earlier non-forfeiture benefit date. But the present lapse rate for industrial
is almost four times that for ordinary life insurancers
Although the lapse of a policy may cost its holder only a few months' pre-
miums, it results in higher costs to the insurer and other policyholders.-c The
expense of servicing and recording the many transactions incident to the issue
and termination of an industrial policy are not paid for until several years of
premiums have been collected. 7 The company recoups some of that loss by
charging the amount of the sales commission against the agent's account.5 3
All other expenses, however, increase the actual cost of operation, and either
increase premiums or lower dividends.
Primary causes of lapse are maldistribution of policies among members of
the family, and overloading-selling more insurance to a family than it can
afford.59 Such policies are the first to be dropped in adverse times. Since even
52. GESELL & HOWE, STUDY OF LEGAL RESERVE LIFE IN-sT_.:cn Cona.mus 231-&2
(TNEC Monograph 28, 1940). In 1940, a study of industrial insurance in Maryland
revealed the following data on terminations of industrial life insurance policies: 524,213
new industrial policies were issued; 487,036 policies were terminated. Almost 80 per cent
of the terminations were by lapse and a "major portion of the lapses were in the very
early years of the policies' life" RESr.aRC Dmwsioz, LEGiSLATn-E Coulcn.- o r M.Any-
LAND, REsEARcH REPORT No 11, IxausTRA. LIn I SURAcE iN. MARYLAm 10-11 (1942).
[Hereafter cited as MARYLAND REPoRT (1942)]. See also TAYLon, Tim SOCL&L CosT or
INDusriALx I¢SURA!NcE 142-44 (1933).
53. See tables in GESELL & HowE, STUDY OF LEGAL REsERVE LIFE In n.:%:su cz CO?1-
PANIEs 279 (TNEC 'Monograph 28, 1940).
54. In two of the three larger insurers, the ratio of lapsed policies to policies main-
tained in force after non-forfeiture benefits have accrued was 6 and 27 per cent respectively.
The insurer with the lower rate, however, paid its earliest non-forfeiture benefit after 2,
weeks. Smaller industrial insurers indicated a ratio ranging up to 50 per cent. Ques-
tionnaire. See also ADLRYLAND REPORT at 11 (1942), indicating that in the boom year of
1940, 78.2 per cent of the terminations of industrial insurance in Maryland were by lapse.
55. See table of lapse and surrender ratios in LIFE IN.SURANCE FAcr Boo, -10 (1950).
See also figures in ME IR & OSLER, MODERNi Lim INsUnANcE 204 (1949).
56. Questionnaire. MEIIR & OSLER, MfoDERN LIFE InsTumAicm 204 (1949). One
large industrial company, however, denied that lapses "significantly affect the cost of
insurance to a continuing policyholder." Other insurers agreed that lapse costs ha1 to
be "met by the Company's operations as a whole."
57. Questionnaire. MERR & OSLER, MODERN LIFE INsunaNcE 314 (1949). See
TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTLRIL INSUIaLNCE 153-57 (1933) for other factors
increasing costs-payment of collection commissions and free coverage for a grace period
of four weeks.
See MARYLAD ,- REPORT at 59 (1942). The report estimated that for 100 whole life
policies issued at age 10 for $250 face value, with an 3 premium, the net loss to the com-
pany at the end of the first year is $1800, and $617 at the end of the second year.
58. Questionnaire.
59. GESELL & HowE, STUDY OF LEGAL RESERVE LIFE INSURA CE COMPA:ums 278
(TNEC Monograph 28, 1940); MAson, THE BRANDFIS WAY 286 (1933).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in times of prosperity the typical industrial policyholder spends a major part
of his earnings on necessities, premiums on an overloaded or maldistributed
policy which seemed small the first week may become an unbearable burden
when paid every week. And when the breadwinner dies or loses his job, real-
distributed policies insuring women and children lapse for lack of income to
pay premiums.
Maldistribution and overloading result from a system of compensation which
puts constant pressure on the agent to sell new insurance."" Although since
1938 the three major industrial insurers pay the agent a conservation con-
mission for maintaining policies, 61 it usually amounts to less than ten per cent
of his income.62  All other compensation is based directly or indirectly on
sales of new insurance.63
Apart from the compensation system, other factors contribute to overloading
and maldistribution. To the agent, collection of premiums on many small
industrial policies in one home is not only convenient, but more profitable."'
Moreover, the agent has as easy time converting the desire for security and
money to pay the expenses of last illness and decent burial into the sale of a
low installment industrial policy6 5 ,Housewives are particularly susceptible
60. CASADY, A BUYER'S GUIDE TO LIFE INSURANCE 14 (1951); GESELL & HOW, A
STUDY OF LEGAL RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 271 (TNEC Monograph 28, 19-10);
cf. PUBLIC AFFAIRS PAMPHLET No. 134, STEWART, BUYING YOUR OWN LIFE INSURANE
2 (1947).
61. D.-ws at 67.
62. The conservation commission of one large industrial insurer's agentg was 9.5
per cent of their total income. Another large insurer stated the commission to be 4 to 5
per cent." Smaller insurers on the average paid about 5 per cent. Some ilid not pay
any conservation commission. Questionnaire.
63. PUBLIC AFFAIRS PAMPHILET No. 134, STEWART, BUYING YOUR OWN LIFE IN-
SURAXCE 2 (1947). See notes 31 and 32 supra. In addition to sales commissions, collec-
tion and conservation commissions are ultimately derived from sales of new policies.
Although an agent loses his sales commission when a policy lapses, text to note 58
supra, and risks a decrease in his conservation compensation if lapses on policies sold by
him exceed the lapse rate of the company as a whole, DAVIS at 67, these penalties arc
patently inadequate deterrents to overselling. The loss in conservation commission is
inevitably small since the total conservation commission is rarely more than five per cent
of the agent's total income. Note 62 supra. If the policy lapses, the agent has neither
gained nor lost a sales commission. It is a small risk, therefore, to sell a policy which
has a questionable future. But if the policy lasts for several years, the agent has gained
both sales and collection commissions.
64. See page 54 supra.
65. One agent described his sales approach as follows:
"AGENT: I will metaphorically draw a hearse up in front of his door an(d
park it there until he signs.
Mr. GESELL: What do you mean by that?
AGENT: I mean I will have to paint pictures of the Grim Reaper and every-
thing else to frighten the person into believing that unless the person is actually
covered with insurance, death might take place almost momentarily."
Quoted from TNEC Hearings in GESELL & HOWE, STUDY OF LrAL 'REqSmV LIFE
INSURANCE COMtPANIES 271 (TNEC Monograph 28, 19-0).
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to the agent's importunings. In 1949, for example. women held 46 per cent
of all industrial insurance in force."" Finally, there is an element of gambling
in the purchase of industrial insurance. The money spent seems a small outlay
for the possible returns.
The cure for the high lapse rate of industrial insurance can come utnly by
removing the pressures which lead to overselling and maldistribution. Careful
selection, training, and supervision of agents and their selling practices would
help.67 If more drastic measures were needed, the insurer could be penalized
for excessive lapse rates. If, for example, the insurer's lapse rate consistently
exceeds a maximum fair to insurers and policyholders alike, sanctions such as
charter revocation or fines could be imposed.68 To keep within the maximum,
all insurers, as some have already done6 9 would take effective steps to prevent
overloading and maldistribution. Accordingly, an insurer might proscribe
sales to non-employed women and children unless the breadwinner already
holds two or three times as much insurance.71 The insurance agent need not
suffer from greatly diminished sales; approximateh' the same amount *f per-
sisting insurance could be sold. But it would be differently-and propery-
distributed among the family.
THE SoutsD HEALTH CLAUSE
Industrial life insurance risks are generally selected without a medical exam-
ination.7 ' The insurer's only information about the medical history and health
66. LIn IxsnAx-cE FACT BooK 22 (19,0). See also T.AYLOn, TiE So:IAL Cto"
OF INDUSTRIAL INStPUNC 120 (1933).
67. Large industrial insurers have, in recent years, devoted much attention t. training
and regulation of agents in an effort to reduce lapse. DAvis at 61-5, 223-8. Lapse
ratios in these companies were con.siderably lower than the ratios in smaller insurers
who have made little effort to reduce lapse. Quetionnaire.
68. Companies chartered or doing business in New York face civil saictik-n.,s if
their expenses in the transaction of industrial insurance exceed a statutory mavinmm.
N.Y. I.s. L.w §213-a. The preposed lapse maximum goes one -tep b%.,nd tht
statute and directly attacks an element in the high cost.
69. The larger insurers have self-imposed limitatio ns on sales to women and children.
See note 70 infra. Smaller insurers have some ineffective limitations. Thlus, tun com-
pany prohibits sales of more than $2000 of insurance to children. Questivomire. T'his
amount is not only high in absolute terms, but meaningless as a device tto prevvnt lapse
because unrelated to the insurance holdings of the breadwinner or the finandal -tatui
of the family.
70. Some larger insurers have a self-impc-tsed limitation aplirtoachim% thi., "No
insurance wvill be issued on a housewife or other adult depuudent \o-hich vild rk.-ult
in more than $500 being in force ou such a person, unless the wage earier i" in-ured
for at least twice the proposed amount. No weekly-premium insurance v.ill Ix
on . . . children under ten which will result in a total outlay of more thani 25 centh
a week . . .Even this amount will not be issued if the father is not insured. (No]
monthly premium industrial policies . . .will ... be issued on juvcnile live, uties
the father is insured for at least $1000:' D.vis at 17.
71. See page 47 supra.
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of the applicant comes from the soliciting agent's investigation 72 and the
insured's own representations in the application. Typically the applicant is
asked whether he is in sound health, has received medical treatment or atten-
tion within the past few years, or had any one of several specified diseases or
symptoms. Additional questions concern height, weight, occupation, and
family medical history.73 In every policy, corresponding provisions permit the
insurer to void the policy if the insured was not in sound health, or if, at the
time the policy was delivered, he had any of the several specified diseaseS.11
This "sound health" clause 7r is the most frequent basis on which industrial
insurers contest claims. If the insured dies within a year or two after tihe
policy is issued,70 the company conducts an investigation into his medical
history. If there is reasonable ground for belief that the insured had mis-
represented the state of his health, or if he breached any of the conditions in
the sound health clause, the claim is likely to be resisted.
Some companies, particularly the larger industrial insurers, have more
liberal practices in paying claims than the clause requires. If, for example,
the insured had a latent disease when the policy was delivered, these insurers
pay the claim despite the wording of the clause. 7 But there is no guarantee
that the practice will continue or that the liberality is applied in every case.
72. See note 10 supra.
73. See, e.g., Metropolitan's application form, DAVIS at 104-5.
74. The sound health clause in the industrial policy takes many forms. It may
require either "delivery in good health," e.g. Western & Southern Life Ins, Co. v.
Spencer, 95 Ind. App. 281, 179 N.E. 794 (1932), full disclosure of all medical treatment
or attention, e.g., Hill v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 App. Div. 278, 18 N.Y.S.
2d 753, 756 (2d Dep't 1940), or both, e.g. Chorney v. Metropolitan Life Ins, Co. 54
R.I. 261, 172 A. 392 (1934). See also clause quoted in note 79 infra.
In 1943,'an analysis of 31 industrial insurers revealed that: 20.8 per cent of the
industrial insurance issued had only the delivery in sound health form of the clause;
23.3 per cent had only the medical treatment clause; and about 20 per cent incorporated
both. DAvis at 262. One large insurer had no sound health clause in the policy and
bases contest solely on misrepresentations in the application attached to the policy. Id.
at 261.
75. See generally TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE 84-6 (1933);
Note, The Delivery-in-good-health clause in Life Insurance Policies, 34 CoL.L.Rrv. 1508
(1934) ; VANCE, INSURANCE § 102 (3d ed. 1951).
76. If the insured dies after one or two years, the policy is, by its terms, incon-
testable. Incontestable clauses appear in virtually every life insurance policy, ordinary
or industrial. Many states have statutes requiring them. VANCE, INSURANcr §97
(3d ed. 1951). Typically the clause states that after one or two years the policy shall
be incontestable except for any circumstance expressly excepted. A majority of the
clauses except only non-payment of premiums and allow the insurer to adjust the size
of the recovery for misstatement of age. Id. at 579.
77. Insurers were asked if they would, in practice, contest a claim if the insured
had a latent disease when the policy issued. Of seven who answered, all but one said
they would not contest. Questionnaire. That they may have no legal obligation to
pay, see page 61 infra.
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Where public relations is not a problem 7s or larger claims are in dispute, the
company is likely to contest.
Before the contest reaches a court, two problems face the claimant. A
policy-now read for the first time-may be worded to give the company an
apparently ironclad case.7 9  Once the claimant hurdles this psychological
barrier, he must decide whether the size of recovery is worth the expense of
litigation." And when the case gets to court, the liberal practices of the
companies will have little effect on the court's decision.
Contest Based on the General Sound Health
General sound health clauses in ordinary and industrial life insurance
policies evoke different legal results. An ordinary life insurer in order to
prevail must prove both the insured's unsound health and its materiality to the
risk.8 ' But the policies of industrial insurers may be interpreted to establish
sound health as a "condition precedent. 81 -2 Accepted legal doctrine requires
78. An insurer's reputation in the neighborhood is particularly important in indus-
trial insurance. The agency system is based on territories and the agent is expected to
blanket an area. DAvis at 54. A strict claims policy may lose sales among hundreds
of prospective customers who hear of it.
79. For example, the policy issued by one large insurer reads:
"If on the date of issue of this policy the Insured was not in sound health,
or if prior to said date, the Insured was rejected for insurance by this or any
other insurer, or had any pulmonary disease, cancer, sarcoma, or any disease ot
the heart or the kidneys, or if within two years prior to said date, the Insured
was attended or treated by any physician or other practitioner, or attended any
hospital or institution of any kind... for any serious disease, complaint or surgical
operation, this policy shall be voidable by the company . . . unless reference to
each such rejection, attendance, treatment or prior disease is endorsed herein by
the Company...."
80. Policies average 300, see note 7 supra. while court costs and attorney's fees
may be as high as in ordinary life insurance litigation. Most cases nmke no provision
for the award of reasonable attorney's fees to the policyholder. See, e.g., cases cited
in notes 82 and 89 infra. But see Weddle v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 130 Neb.
744, 266 N.W. 624 (1936) ($200 attorney's fee awarded because "tie case was ably
and vigorously argued" and "presented new and important issues of law.").
Some states have statutes imposing penalties on unsuccessfully contesting insurers.
The penalty is a reasonable attorney's fee plus a percentage of the recovery. Eig.,
GA. CODE AN x. 56-706 (1933). But under these statutes the penalty is payable only
when the contest is in bad faith, ibid., or vexatious and without reasonable cause. ILL
STAT. Axx.. c. 73 §767 (1940).
81. Logan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 107 Wash. 253, 181 Pac 906, 90S 11919); 21
APPLEMAN. INSURANCE LAW AND PR.eriCE § 12426 (1945). But see V.N-CF, I-.scrLzcE
643 (3d ed. 1951). Vance states that there is a conflict of authority on the burden of
proof. Although the cases he cites do go both ways, Vance's authorities for the prorlusi-
tion that the insured or beneficiary has the burden of proving sound health are three
industrial insurance cases and one ordinary life insurance precedent. VA'CF, Op. cit.
supra, at 643 n.21.
82. E.g., Connolly v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 322 Mass. 678, 79 X.-E-d
189, 191 (1948) ; Packard v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 72 N.H. 1, 54 A. 287 (1903).
Benzinger v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 317 Pa. 561, 176 A. 9"L (1935).
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a claimant to affirmatively prove performance of every condition precedent
to recovery. 3 If the claimant cannot prove sound health, insurers may success-
fully contest without offering any evidence of his unsound health.8 4
Actual not apparent good health is required by the clause.85 Testimony of
relatives, friends, neighbors, or employer is not decisive proof of the insured's
good health.80 A qualified doctor familiar with the insured's health at the time
of policy delivery could prove actual good health, but rarely is a doctor with
this knowledge available. Consequently, a claimant would have to resort to a
difficult and costly post-mortem examination to establish the sound health
requisite to recovery.8 7
The time reference of the industrial sound health clause raises further diffi-
culties in the claimant's case. While the clause in ordinary policies generally
refers only to changes in health between acceptance and delivery,88 the indus-
83. Fondi v. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co., 224 Mass. 6, 7, 112 N.E. 612 (1916);
VANce, INSURANrCE 423 (3d ed. 1951); PATTERSON, EsSENTIALS OF INSURANCz LAW
205 (1935). But cf. Weddle v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 130 Neb. 744, 266 N.W.
624, 627 (1936) (sound health a condition precedent, but insurer has the burden of proving
that the insured was not in sound health). See also MAss. GEx. LAws c. 175 § 186-a
(1949). Under the statute delivery of a life insurance policy creates a presumption that
any condition precedent to the formation of the contract has been performed, What efyect
this will have on the burden of proving conditions precedent to liability is uncertain.
84. See, e.g., Connolly v. John Hancock M1utual Life Ins. Co., 322 Mass. 678, 79
N.E. 2d 189 (1948) ; Mohr v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 32 R.I. 177, 78 A.
554, 556 (1911) ; cf. Ruggiro v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 113 N.J. Law 561, 174 A.
882 (1934), (if policy was delivered, insurer has burden of going forward, but Claimant
still has risk of non-persuasion).
The condition precedent rationale is not universal by any means, 'Many courts have
decided that the insurer has the burden of proof whatever label is attached to the sound
health clause. E.g., Krajewski v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 305 Ill. App. 64, 26
N.E. 2d 892 (1940).
85. See, e.g., Hinnenkemp v. M%'etropolitan Life Ins. Co., 134 Neb. 846, 279 N.W. 784,
786 (1938) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Chappell, 151 Tenn. 299, 310, 311, 269 S.W.
21, 25 (1925) ; Barker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 188 Mass. 542, 74 N.E. 945, 947
(1905).
86. See, e.g., Conlon v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 R.I. 88, 183 A. 850, 852
(1936): Smolinsky, Adm'r. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 149 Pa. Super. 72, 26 A.2d
131, 134 (1942) (testimony of trained doctor necessary to prove sound health) ; National
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Whitlock, 198 Okla. 561, 180 P.2d 647, 649 (1946) (actual
sound health required, testimony of wife of insured not conclusive proof. "Good health
.* could be determined only by skilled medical practitioners or professional men of
scientific ability. . . ."). Cf. Kelly v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 131 Cont. 106,
108, 38 A.2d 176, 177 (1944). See Note, 14 Mo.L.Rv. 204, 205 (1949).
87. Needless to say, no claimant would resort to a post-mortem examination. Apart
from the expense, it would in most cases require disinterring the insured. Recovery on
industrial policies will rarely, if ever, justify such a step. Yet, in the absence of a cjuali-
fled doctor familiar with the actual state of the insured's health, a post-mortem examinla-
tion seems the only way to demonstrate the actual good health of the insured.
88. VANCx, I sURANcE 642-3 (3d ed. 1951). Vance notes a conflict among rulings
on the time reference of the sound health clause. But the authorities supporting the
proposition that "a majority" of courts interpret the clause to refer to health at the
[Vol. 61:46
1952] COVERAGE OF INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE 61
trial clause more frequently demands sound health on the delivery date5 A
pre-existing latent disease which might not impair the ordinary claimant's right
to recover 90 thus bars recovery to the industrial claimant.9 1 Where the burden
of proof is on the claimant, sound health on one particular date is more difficult
to prove than the fact that the insured did not acquire an ailment within a
certain period of time .12 Where the burden of proof is on the insurer, it need
not undertake the difficult proof that a disease developed in the interval. And
since the insured's health typically declines, the insured's proof of unsound
health at a later date is manifestly simpler. Whichever party has the burden
of proof, the time reference of the industrial sound health clause can only aid
the insurer.
Contest Based on the Non-111edical Treatment Clause
Some industrial companies, notably the larger industrial insurers, have
eliminated the general sound health clause. In its place, a clause permits the
company to void the policy only if within two years before issuance, the insured
had medical treatment or attention not reported in his application. 3 This
variant of the sound health clause, although more favorable than the broader
time of delivery are predominantly industrial insurance precedents. Id. at 642, n16. More-
over. many courts which hold that the clause refers only to a change in health between
application acceptance and delivery date exempt non-medical policies from the operatin
of the rule. Compare New York Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 129 Miss. 544, 91 So. 456
(1922) (ordinary life insurance) uith National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Green, 191
Miss. 581, 3 So.2d 812 (1941) (non-medical policy).
89. E.g., Auriemma v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 323 Ill. App. 271, 55
N.E.2d 292 (1944) ; Hinnenkamp v. 'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 134 Neb. 846, 279 N.W.
784 (1938); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Green, 191 Miss. 581, 3 So-2d 312
(1941). Contra: National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, 230 Ky. 222, 18 S.W2d
982, 983 (1929) (recovery allowed although the insured had tuberculosis at delivery
and before application acceptance) ; Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 14 Life Cases 113, 115
(Ga. App. 1950) (sound health clause held no defense unless insured's disease developed
during the period).
90. E.g., National Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Ware, 169 Okla. 618, 37 "P. 2d
905, 907 (1934) (sound health clause does not protect insurer from latent and unknown
bodily conditions which existed prior to the application).
91. See, e.g., Auriemma v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 323 IlL App. 271, 55
N.E2d 292, 293 (1944); Karp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., So N.H. 124, 164 A. 219,
220 (1933) (heart condition existing both at application and delivery bars recovery).
92. To show that no ailment was acquired within the period between the application
acceptance and policy issuance, the claimant need show only (a) that the disease existed
before the earlier date or (b) that the insured had no ailment within the peried.
93. Questionnaire. The clause reads: "If within two years before the date of issue
of this policy the insured has received institutional hospital, medical, or surgical treat-
ment or attention, this policy shall be voidable by the company ... unless ... the insured
or claimant under this policy shows by the clear preponderance of the evidence that the
condition occasioning such treatment or attention was not material to the risk... pro-
vided, however, that this policy shall not be voidable [if] information .. was disclosed
in a written application for this policy."
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form, still imposes a heavy burden on the claimant. Though an appli-
cant can be expected to remember and report treatment for a serious disorder,
he may have had medical attention for a seemingly trivial disease or for a
disease not serious at the time.9 4 Moreover, a doctor may not have informwd
him of the gravity of the disorder.9 5 Under these circumstances an applicant
may easily fail to recollect or report the treatment. In court, however, the
insurer need not prove the existence of a disease or its materiality to the risk;
it must prove only unreported treatment. 0 To recover, the claimant must
then proceed to prove that the disorder was not serious or material. The diffi-
culty and expense of proving non-seriousness or non-materiality is manifest.
Often the claimant will be unable to bring into court any evidence of the dis-
order actually treated. Even if he can produce this evidence, a medical expert
may be needed to testify that it was not a "serious disorder" or that it was
not material to the risk. For claimants under low-valued policies, that proof
and even the litigation itself may not be worth the expense.
Sound Health Clauses Limiting the Companies' Liability
In the policies of some industrial insurers, another variant of the sound
health clause reduces or eliminates insurers' liability if the insured dies of
any one of a number of specified diseases within one or two years after the
policy is issued.9 7  The list of diseases is long and typically includes all of the
major killers.9 s Under such clauses, recovery is denied although the insured
was free from any of the diseases when the policy issuedY9  While these
94. E.g., Colver v. Continental Assur. Co., 220 Iowa 407, 409, 411, 262 N.W. 791,
793 (1935). See cases collected in Note, 131 A.L.R. 617, 621-22 (1941).
Courts construe medical treatment strictly. Treatment for trivial or temporary dis-
orders may be held "treatment" within the meaning of the non-medical attendance or
treatment clause. Cases collected in Note, 63 A.L.R. 846, 848 c seq. (1929).
95. E.g., Klein v. Farmers' & Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 132 Kan. 748, 297 Pac. 730,
731 (1931) (blood test revealed pernicious anemia; insured never informed of results
of blood test, failed to report treatment) ; See Tolar v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297
N.Y. 441, 80 N.E.2d 53, 56 (1948) (dissentinj opinion) (insured who failed to report
the medical treatment was never informed of her serious ailment).
96. E.g., Tolar.v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 297 N.Y. 441, 80 N.E.2d 53, 55
(1948) (court upholds rule that the insurer need not prove the existence of instred's
ailment or its materiality to the risk).
97. Typical of the clauses is: "The company shall pay no more than one eighth of
the death benefit named herein should death occur in the first six months of this policy's
existence, one quarter of same should death occur in the second six months, and o1n
half ... should death occur in the third six months, should such death result front or
be contributed to by heart disease, tuberculosis, chronic bronchitis, cancer, Bright's
disease, pneumonia, liver trouble, pellegra, cerebral hemorrhage, paralysis, high blood
pressure, influenza, or any chronic disease." Gray v. Louisiana Industrial Life Ins. Co.,
193 So. 278, 279 (La. 1940). See variation of limited liability clauses in Universal Life
Ins. Co. v. Lillard, 14 Life Cases 232 (Tenn. 1950) (death due directly or indirectly to
specified diseases) ; Walker v. Superior Life Ins. Co., 62 A.2d 192 (Mun. Ct., D.C. 1948).
98. See note 97 .supra.
99. See, e.g., Gray v. Louisiana Industrial Life Ins. Co., 193 So. 278 (La. 1940).
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clauses are regularly enforced by courts,100 they are reasonable only if the
premiums are lowered to correspond to the vastly smaller risk which the
insurer covers.' 0 If premiums are not lowered or dividends raised, the com-
pany gets a windfall every time a policyholder dies of one of the diseases.
The Multiple Sound Health Clause
Mlost industrial life insurance applications require representation of sotud
health, non-medical treatment and freedom from specified diseases.' 0 2 These
requirements reappear as conditions of liability in the policy.103 If a contesting
insurer is confronted with the defense that the agent falsified answers in the
application,' °4 the insurer can prevail on the theory that contest is not based
on any misrepresentation but on breach of the conditions in the policy.0 3
Likewise, these multiple conditions can circumvent some statutory restrictions.
For example, a statute prevents insurers from resisting claims on the basis
of health if medical examination has been waived and the applicant's answers
are recorded by the agent. 0 6 Insurers may avoid such statutes by arguing
that the contest is not based on h~alth but on the non-medical treatment
condition. 0 7 The multiple sound health clause, therefore, can be a multiple
trap for the insured.
Although one company has eliminated the sound health clause in all its
forms,0 s it serves some function. The clause gives insurers a method,
100. See, e.g., Williams v. Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co., 163 Tenn. 262, 43
S.V.2d 215 (1931) ; Walker v. Superior Life Ins. Co., 62 A.2d 192 (Iun. Ct., D.C. 1948) ;
Gordon v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 215 La. 25, 39 So.2d 812 (1949). But see N. Y. I-s. L.wv
§ 163(3) (b) (clauses limiting liability where death results from a specific disease unlay.,-
ful in New York).
101. In upholding these clauses, courts do not e-,mine the premium or dividend rates
of the insurers issuing the policies. See cases cited in notes 97 and 100 supra.
102. See, e.g., Metropolitan's application form printed in DAvIs at 104-5.
103. See note 74 supra.
104. See page 67 infra for the effect of such a defense.
105. E.g., Western & Southern Life Insurance Company v. Van Hoose's Adm'x., 23
Ky. 577, 142 S.W.2d 145, 147 (1940). Cf. Anderson v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 316 I1. App. 338, 45 N.E.2d 39, 41 (1942) (insurer need not prove misrepresenta-
tions to void policy where contest based on sound health clause) ; cf. Chortney v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 54 P-I. 261, 172 A. 392, 393 (1934) (by basing contest on the sound
health clause, insurer circumvents statute requiring prooi that misrepresentation concerned
a disorder which contributed to the insured's death).
106. E.g., PA. STAT. Axx. tit. 40, § 511-a (Supp. 1950).
107. E.g., Smolinsky-, Adm'r. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 149 Pa. Super. 72, 26 A2d
131, 133-4 (1942); Pachter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 144 Pa. Super. 183, 19 A.2d
507, 508 (1941) ; cf. Prilleux v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 4 So.2d 763, 772-3 (La. App.
1941) (statute requiring proof of wilfull misrepresentation avoided by basing Co.ntest ,,n
policy provision). But cf. Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 19% 'Minn. 372,
265 NA.. 28 (1936).
108. An inspection of sample industrial insurance policies received by the YtA.n LAw
jorax.k revealed that one large insurer had no sound health or non-medical treatment
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however crude, for segregating clearly uninsurable risks. Where the policy-
holder fraudulently misstates the condition of his health, the clause offers the
company a clear basis for contesting the claim. On the other hand, sound
health is not a fact, but an opinion. 09 If the applicant honestly believes lie
is free from specific diseases and reports that belief to the agent, the insurer
who waives a medical examination and relies on the opinion should not be
permitted to defeat claims by later holding the insured to a statement of fact.110
Courts in ordinary life insurance cases "increasingly treat statements of general
health as mere opinion."' Under these precedents, the insurer, to escape
liability, must prove that the opinion was not honestly held.11 2 Industrial
insurers, however, need not make this showing." 3
clause. Davis notes that this insurer bases contest solely on statements in the application)
a copy of which is attached to the policy. DAvis at 26J.
109. Some courts have so held. See, e.g., Service Life Ins. Co. of Omaha v. ,Mc-
Cullough, 234 Iowa 817, 13 N.W.2d 440, 444-5 (1944); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Wiggins, 15 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1926); Lampke v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
279 N.Y. 157, 18 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1938).
110. VANcE, INSURANcE 394, 403 (3d ed. 1951). See also National Life & Accident
Ins. Co. v. Green, 191 Miss. 581, 3 So.2d 812, 814 (1941) (dissenting opinion): "If the
insurance company, in order to avoid the expense incident to a medical examination,
should choose to accept the risk on the recommendation of their soliciting agents, they
should be bound by such acceptance in the absence of proof that the applicant has
knowingly made those representations in order to obtain the insurance." See Note, 14
Mo.L.REv. 204, 205 (1949): "The applicant who with good reason actually believcq
himself in sound health is subject to a manifest injustice when the insurer is allowed
to avoid its obligation subsequently by a showing that there was in fact an existing
illness which ultimately contributed to the death. By the insertion of the sound health
clause the applicant makes his actual state oi health-not what he believes is health to
be-an operative condition having the same harsh consequences as formerly arose from
the currently supposed abrogated doctrine of common law warranty."
Many insurers now ask the applicant questions on which he can have certain knowl-
edge. John Hancock, for example, asks the insured: Have you ever had, or consulted or
been treated by a physician or other practitioner for any of the following: Disease of
the heart; pain in the chest; shortness of breath; any surgical operations? John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 14 Life Cases 1050 (Ky. 1951). Yet, the court in the
same case notes that an innocent misrepresentation will void the policy. Id. at 1051.
111. PATRFSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 342 (1935); Prosser, Innocent
Misrepresentations of Health in Insurance Applications, 28 MIN . L. REv. 141, 145
(1944) ; See VANCE, INSURANCE 643 (3d ed. 1951). Vance's authority is, however, an in-
dustrial insurance case. Hinnenkemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 134 Neb. 846, 279 N.W.
784 (1938). An earlier edition of Vance is in accord with PAMraso and PRossEL, so pra.
VANCE, INsURANcE 377 (2d ed. 1930).
112. Service Life Ins. Co. of Omaha v. McCullough, 234 Iowa 817, 13 N.W.2d 440
(1944); PATrERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 339 (1935); 1 APiLEMAN, INSUR-
ANE LAW AND PRAcTICE §216 (1941).
113. See, e.g., DeFord v. National Life and Accident Ins. Co., 182 Tenn. 255, 185
S.W.2d 617 (1945); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Green, 191 Miss. 581, 3 S.2d
812, 813 (1941). See VANCE, INSURANCE 34 (3d ed. 1951): [T]he courts appear to
hold an applicant for a non-medical life insurance policy to a higher degree of good faith
because of the fact that with this type of policy the insurer has not had the benefit of a
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To guarantee recovery by all legitimate claimants, the insurer should carry
the burden of proving unsound health, the materiality of any misrepresenta-
tion, and the fraudulent character of any statement of opinion. The insurer,
contesting on the basis of the general sound health clause, should prevail only
where the opinion as to health is not honestly held. In addition, the industrial
sound health clause, just as the clause in ordinary life insurance policies,
should refer only to a change in health between the dates of application accept-
ance and policy issuance.
The non-medical treatment clause is less subject to objection. If the com-
pany is given notice of medical treatment, it cannot contest. 114 But insufar
as the burden of proving non-materiality and non-seriousness is shifted to the
claimant, the clause may unduly prejudice legitimate recovery. Since the
insurer contests on the basis of unreported treatment it discovers, it can be
expected to have information on the nature of the disorder.lla To require the
claimant to carry the burden of a costly and often impossible prouf seems not
only uneconomical but unjust.
While reform of existing doctrine would permit virtually every non-frautdu-
lent claimant to recover, recoveries on fraudulent claims could spread." 0(
medical examination ... but relies entirely on answers of applicant as to his health
and medical history." See also National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Atha, 0.9 Ga, App.
8225, 26 S.E.2d 675, 677 (1943). But see, Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 155 Fla. _5M, 21
So.2d 39, 40 (1943) (industrial policy, insured died from ulcers, recovery allwl hecaume
insured "did not know" of the existence of the disorder).
114. See page 61 supra.
115. "The insurance company is . . .in a position where it is, or should be, better
able to produce the requisite testimony as to health than the beneficiary, and no hardship
can be said to result from placing the burden to produce evidence upon the party best
able to do so." Rosenblum v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 51 Wyo. 195, 65 P.2d 399, 405 (1937).
116. Fear of fraudulent recoveries in large part motivated courts to construct harsh
industrial insurance doctrines. See Clark v. Prudential In'. C-1. si America. 219 WiF.
422, 263 N.A. 264, 265-6 (1935). (non-medical selection of risks influenced court to
hold that sound health is a condition precedent). Fraud and bad faith are o'ften ditficult
items of proof. Fuller, The Special Nature of the ff'age-Earner's Life Insurance l'rr-
lem, 2 LAw & CoxTM.P. Pao. 10, 43 (1935). Every fraudulent recovery raises cocts
to honest policyholders. But every rule attempting to eliminate fraudulent recoveries
may frustrate legitimate claims. Some courts have perceived this as more costly than
allowing some fraudulent claimants to recover. In these jurisdictions recovery is. there-
fore, governed by rules which are similar to those applicable in ordinary life cases.
See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor's Adm'r., 219 Ky. 549, 293 SN. 1051,
1062 (1927) (sound health clause refers only to time between application and delivery) ;
Pierce v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 178 S.E. 189, 191 (Ga. App. 1935) lacc. rd);
Schmidt v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 190 Minn. 239, 251 X.W. 63 (1933 (icourt
upholds legislative action binding insurer in non-medical policies to an applicant's honest
opinion as to health).
See also MACLEAN, LiFE IxsrANcE 219 (1935): "Where the anuunt of insurance is
small, there is little inducement for fraud... " TAYLOR, TiE SOCIAL COST OF IND LSTMAL
IxsuRANcE 85 (1933): "For the most part . . . statements regarding haith are
undoubtedly made in good faith. .. ."
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Faced, however, with potentially greater liability, the insurer would exert
greater effort to detect fraud at the time of the selection of risks. Wasteful
litigation and pre-litigation investigation would be replaced by more thorough-
going investigation at the selection stage." 7 Rejection of applications would
eliminate the costs of paying commissions, administering policies, and contest-
ing them. Since an illness of which the insured is aware is difficult to conceal,
an agent's diligent investigation would often suffice."18 Even if fraudulent
claims filtered through to recovery, the cost would be spread among thousands
of policyholders. No longer would catch-all rules frustrate some legitimate
claimants' recoveries in the attempt to weed out fraud.
JUDICIAL DISPOSITION OF FRAUDULENT APPLICATIONS
Although non-medical selection of risks invites fraudulent applications, the
agent himself is often the cause." 9 Typically, he asks the questions and records
the answers on the application. Because no doctor or other company employee
checks the certification of the risk, the agent can insert any answer which
117. Much information can be gathered by a diligent agent. Height, weight, and
age, correlated with occupation and environment, can give the insurer useful itnforma-
tion. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 201-2 (1935) ; MEHR & OSLER, MODERN Lir INsvt,-
ANcE 246-50 (1949). DAVIS at 107-8. Habits and reputation in the neighborhood, as
well as the general knowledge of friends, neighbors, and employers will, in many cases,
segregate risks which are uninsurable. The time and expense of such an inspection is
minimal. The industrial agent operates in a given neighborhood, id. at 54, and becomes
familiar with its residents. Nothing more than a phone call or a visit to a neighbor may
spot a fraudulent application.
Insurers have found by experience that "nothing is to be gained by subjecting the
applicant to a medical examination." Wood, Influence of the Medical Examination on
Life Underwriting, in address delivered' before the Association of Life Insurance Pres-
idents, New York, December 4, 1925, quoted in TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL COST OF INDVSi-
TRIAL INSURANCE 115 (1933). Taylor says: "Indeed, it is estimated that the selection
produced by medical examination disappears in the case of Industrial policy-holders in
the second year. That is, leaving out the mortality experience of the first year, . . .
Industrial policy-holders who have not submitted to a medical examination . . . will
show about as good a record as a group who have been examined." Id.
118. A person with a disorder serious enough to materially increase the insurable
risk rarely conceals its existence from friends, neighbors, or his employer. Either he
informs them directly or by inference. Thus, the information may come to an employer
by the applicant's absence from work or by his inability to do heavy work, Moreover,
neighbors usually know if the insured has recently visited a doctor, or who the family
doctor is. Local clinics have much information on families in the neighborhood. Brief
but careful questioning of such persons will usually reveal the existence of a disorder or
enough suspicious facts to induce the agent to require a medical examination.
119. Some insurers admit this, Questionnaire. And observers agree. TAYLOR, Tut
SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE 116 (1932). See letter of the actuary of the
Massachusetts Insurance Department, 1930, quoted in id. at 96-9. See, e.g., National
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Scott, 14 Life Cases 1052, 1053 (Ky. 1951) and cases cited
in Notes 122, 130, 131 infra.
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permits the policy to issue.1 -20 Where the fraudulent application results from
collusion between agent and applicant, the law is clear that the policy is void-
able. 121 But if the agent falsifies or omits the applicant's honestly and fully
reported medical history, the law offers uncertain protection to the innocent
industrial policyholder.
A claimant may admit to the insured's unsound health, but blame the agent
for its misrepresentation in the application. 2  The doctrines of waiver or
estoppel are the legal tools with which the claimant seeks recovery.12 A
waiver'2 4 occurs where the company has lmowledge-actual or constructive-
of the applicant's unsound health, but then issues a policy and collects pre-
miums on it. 5 Estoppel, on the other hand, prevents the insurer from con-
testing where the applicant has been injuriously misled to believe himself a
covered risk.1' The agent's falsifications or omissions in filling out the appli-
cation typically estop the insurer from contesting on the basis of the facts
misrepresented.-
7
These doctrines, however, do not guarantee recovery in industrial insurance
cases; courts may apply three contrary rationales. In the first place, when the
applicant signs his application, he has usually placed his signature below a state-
ment which denies the agent's authority to waive answers, modify the applica-
tion, or bind the company by making promises or receiving information.- '
120. An agent inserting false answers runs several risks. He may love his license,
e.g., N.Y. Ixs. LAw § 117(1) (c), or he may be discharged by the insurer if there are
complaints by claimants. His risk appears great in relation to the returns-a few dollars
in commissions-but the chance of detection is small. If the policyholder lives after
the contestable period of one or two years. the company rarely inve.tigates. Cf. National
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hearn, 14 Life Cases 819, 820 (Okla. 1951) (agent testified
that supervisor encouraged him to write policy if agent thought insured would outlive
the contestable period). The spot checks on agents' practices are not eXtensive, and
formal complaints to state insurance departments On license revccation procccdilngs are
rare. See statement by 'assachusetts Insurance Department Actuary quute.d in TAYLUK!,
Tna SOCLIL COST OF INDUSTMIL INSUrNCE 98 (1933).
121. Mutual Aid Union v. Blacknall, 129 Ark 450, 196 SAV. 792, 795 (1917) ; VIxrcc,
I.NsURANCE 536-7 (3d ed. 1951).
122. E.g., Kelly v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 131 Conn. 1040, 33 A2d 176
(1944); Kentucky Cent. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Lynn, 304 Ky. 416, 201 SAV2d
946 (1947).
123. See, e.g., Lempke v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 279 N.Y. 157, 18 N.E24 14
(1938) ; Colegrove v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 153 SA.2d 750 (Mo. App. 1941).
VANcE, INsuRAm cE §§81-90 (3d ed. 1951).
124. VAxcE, INsUrAN E §81 (3d ed. 1951).
125. XTANcr, IN.suRANcE §83 (3d ed. 1951).
126. VANCE, I.zsrANCE § S9 (3d ed. 1951).
127. Ibid. See cases cited in 17 APPL.,mAN, I,.stmrANxcE L.w AND Pn cxcf c 9-01
(1945).
128. This is substantially the wording of the limitation in the application of one of the
three large industrial insurers. Most other insurers have similar limitations in citla.r
or both the application and policy.
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The policy usually contains a like provision.129 In the face of this blanket
limitation on the agent's authority, courts deny recovery even where the mis-
representation admittedly was the agent's work.130 Secondly, by signing the
application, the policyholder can be held to have ratified the fraudulent mis-
statements of the agent. 131 Recovery is denied because the insured cannot be
innocent; it takes two to make a fraudulent application.1 2 Finally, most in-
dustrial insurance applications and policies carefully state that any ill-health
or past disease must be endorsed in the policy by an official of the company.
Recovery is denied to an insured whose disorder or medical attention is not
included in the endorsement.133
When the fraudulent application results from the agent's misstatement, legal
doctrines generally offer the court a choice of protecting the innocent insurer
or the innocent policyholder. Since the agent's falsification of answers raises
an estoppel, 34 courts could avoid the express limitation on the agent's authority
129. E.g., Jones v. Liberty National Life Ins. Co., 47 So.2d 222, 224 (Ala. App. 1949),
aff'd., 47 So.2d 227 (1950).
130. See, e.g., Jones v. Liberty National Life Ins. Co., 47 So.2d 222 (Ala. App. 1949),
aff'd., 47 So.2d 227 (1950) (insured told agent he had cancer, agent never recorded the
fact, insured never read or signed the application) ; DeFord v. National Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 182 Tenn. 255, 185 S.W.2d 617, 621 (1945) (insured chargeable with knowledge
of limitation of agent's authority). Cf. Richardson v. Alta Life Ins. Co., 153 Pa. Super,
310, 33 A.2d 783, 785 (1943) (illiterate insured who does not demand that limitation of
agent's authority be read and explained to him is guilty of "supine negligence.") ; DeFord
v. National Life and Accident Ins. Co., supra. (if insured could not read limitation of
4gent's authority, he had a duty to have it read to him). But ef. Devoe v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 262 App. Div. 933, 28 N.Y.S.2d 919 (3d Dep't 1941) (insured not
chargeable with notice as to limitation on agent's authority).
131. E.g. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 133 N.J. Eq. 65, 30 A.2d 297 (1943).
132. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Samis, 172 Md. 517, 192 A. 335, 338
(1937) (as a matter of law, applicant guilty of fraud. "The aid of the . . . insured . . .
was essential."); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 133 N.J. Eq. 65, 30 A.2d 297,
299 (1943) (applicant in accepting the policy and application attached has "adopted and
ratified the lagent's] misstatements.").
It is often deemed irrelevant that the insured did not read the application before
signing it. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Samis, supra; Kelly v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 131 Conn. 106, 38 A.2d 176, 177 (1944) ("inexcusable negligence" not to
read answers written in application; "duty to know the contents of application signed
by [insured].").
133. See, e.g., Adkins v. Kentucky Cent. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 131 W. Va, 638,
48 S.E.2d 436 (1948); Kentucky Central Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Lynn, 304 Iy.
416, 200 S.W.2d 946, 948 (1947). "We perceive that an insurer's agent might waive
every precautionary feature of a written application for an insurance policy and might
act in such a misleading manner that only the jail should be his proper home, yet if
the contract itself , . . subsequently came along and said on its face 'this is our binding
agreement and only the insurer's president or secretary may waive any part of it' we
see no basis for excusing the insured from the operative force of such a contract, as
written and delivered. . . . [Ilt was incumbent upon him to have read it over and then,
if dissatisfied with his contract as written, to have raised a righteous row in protest,
134. See page 67 vtpra.
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and the required endorsement of unsound health by invoking the doctrine
that such policy provisions are inoperative in estoppel cases 3 :; Under this
rule the company is bound so long as the fraud of the agent occurs in the course
of the agent's employment-even though expressly forbidden. 12 Because
actual knowledge of the false answers is necessary for a binding ratification,
courts could avoid the policyholder ratification theory31r since, by definition,
the innocent policyholder has no actual knowledge. Where his knowledge is
proven, the policy is voidable for collusiorl1 33
Aside from available legal principles, sound reasons for protecting the appli-
cant exist. Insurance applicants, especially industrial insurance applicants,
rarely read the completed application or the limitation of the agent's author-
ity,130 nor might they understand it if they did. Moreover, the applicant fully
relies on the agent; what he says and does is to the policyholder synonymous
with what the company says and does.140
In industrial cases, however, courts have often chosen to protect the inurmr.
Because no medical examination screens risks, these courts fear a fluod of
fraudulent applications. 14' Moreover, in every estoppel case the insured is
135. See, e.g., National Aid Life Ass'n v. Clinton, 176 Okla. 372, 55 P.2d 781 (1935)
(limitation on agent's authority) ; Bennett v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 203 IM. 439, 67
N.E. 971 (1903); VArce, -zsuRANcE §90 (3d ed. 1951); 16 AprmwiTA:, I:zst'aum:cn
LAW AND PRacricE 780-81 (1945); Bordelon v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 1E-7
So. 112, 114 (La. App. 1939) (endorsement).
Vhere the application is attached to the policy, complications may arise. The thoary
is that the insured has an opportunity to examine the agent's misstatements and, upon
learning that there is misrepresentation, has a duty to notify the insurer. E.g., Forwold
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 117 Md. 254, 83 A. 169 (1912). But some courts
have held this fact immaterial. E.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, S0 Ga.
App. 713, 179 S.E. 239, 243 (1935), aff'd., 182 Ga. 213, 185 S.E. 263 (1936). See also
VANcE, INsURANcE 263 (3d ed. 1951), stating that a majority of courts considering the
question have held that the insured may show he has not read the application and had
no kmowledge of misstatements contained therein.
Another rationale available to courts as a device for allowing recovery is that clauses
limiting the agent's authority do not affect a waiver resulting from delivery of the policy
itself by an agent with knowledge of unsound health. E.g., Hill v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 259 App. Div. 278, 18 N.Y.S.2d 753, 755 (2d Dep't 1940).
136. V.AzcE, INsuRAxcE 546 (3d ed. 1951). This is true whether the company line%,
of the true facts or not. Ibid.
137. Continental Ins. Co. of New York v. Pierce, 39 Kan. 396, IS Pac. 291, 295 (IM);
Clubb v. American Accident Co. of Louisville, 27 Ga. 502, 25 S.E. 333 (1895) (insurer
unable to contest so long as applicant was ignorant of false answers in application); 17
APPLEmA.N, IlsuRANcE LAW AND P .cTICE 9 (1945) : "The fact that ite insured may
have signed the application would not render him responsible for false statements inserted
by the agent therein without his knowledge where he had given truthful answers and
had no reason to believe that they would be falsified by the company's representative.'
138. Note 121 vtpra.
139. See VAicz, INsuRA-cE 258 (3d ed. 1951).
140. TA- oR, THE: SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL INSUr'NCE: 131 (1933).
141. E.g., Kentucky Central Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Lynn, 304 Ky. 416, 269
S.W.2d 946, 949 (1947) (unless court protected insurer, it would not have "a rca-ion-
able opportunity to remain in business.").
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usually an uninsurable risk. Implicit in the decisions is the view that allowing
recovery simply because an agent falsified answers would be unjust to the in-
surer.
Although preventing fraud and denying recovery on uninsurable risks are
desirable enough objectivds, protecting the insurer in court need not achieve
them. Under present case law, the insurer is as often protected from its own
agent's fraud as it is from the policyholder's.1 4 2 But if the insurer were bound
by every fraudulent act and statement of its agent in the course of employ-
ment,143 innocent policyholders would always recover. Ultimately, insurers
would act to reduce recoveries by uninsurable risks.144 But as long as an
insurer can find protection in finely printed stipulations enforced by courts,
effective action in weeding out fraudulent applicants may be long in coming.
PRESENT CHECKS ON INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE
Legislative Regulation
Present statutory control of industrial life insurance is inadequate to the
task. Industrial life insurance is frequently exempt from mandatory benefits
140
and policy provisions required of ordinary life insurers.140 Few states have
statutes designed to solve the problem of non-medical selection of risks. Some,
however, permit successful contest of claims only if the insurer can prove wilful
misrepresentation on the applicant's part.147 Problems of waiver and estoppel
are generally left to courts. 1 48  And while several states have directed legis-
142. See, for example, cases cited in note 130 supra.
143. VANCE, INsuRAxcE 433 et seq. (3d ed. 1951).
144. See page 66 supra.
145. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 10861.5 (1950) (exempting industrial insurance con-
tracts from requirement of notice of lapse) ; TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 6184, 6180(5) (Michie
Supp. 1950) (exempting industrial from provision limiting excepted risks) ; MASS. ANN.
LAWS c.175, § 132(11) (1948) (exempting industrial insurance from policy provisions
requiring grace periods, participation in surplus, etc.) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.38(1),
61.30(7) (1946) (exempting industrial insurance from requirement of granting loans after
three years).
146. E.g., Ox".A. STAT., tit. 36, §§ 227, 218 Supp. (1950) (exempting industrial insur-
ance from section requiring standard policy provisions); IDAno CoDE ANN. § 41-1503
(1948) (accord); Oms. Come. LAWS ANN. §§ 101-506, 501 (1940) (accord), But see
N. Y. INS. LAW §§ 163, 213-a, 208-a (standard provisions and cost regulation of industrial
life insurance); ILL. ANN. STAT. c.73 § 841 (1940) (standard provisions for industrial
life insurance).
147. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3396 (Mason 1927), Haan v. Palladium National
Life Ins. Co., 201 Minn. 135, 275 N.W. 689 (1937); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 511a
(1935), Schware v. Home Life Ins. Co., 134 Pa. Super. 53, 3 A.2d 949 (1939).
148. See 17 APPLEm.AN, IxsuRAN CE LAW AND PRAcTiCE §9497 (1945); VANCE,
INsuRANcE § 5 (3d ed. 1951).
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lative attention to cost reduction,149 the statutory schemes fail to attack the
underlying causes of industrial insurance's high cost to policyholders. 1 9
Rcgulation by Competition
Competition from alternative types of life insurance has likewise failed to
cure defects in industrial insurance. None of four potentially vigorous com-
petitors has directly challenged the appeal of industrial-universal availability,
"easy" payment in low installments, and immediate cash benefits upon death.
In recent years, group insurance has been the most significant alternative.1 "'
Available where a specified percentage 2 of employees of an enterprise form
a group with the employer's consent, group insurance in force exceeds the
face value of industrial insurance in force.10 3 The policies are generally issued
without medical examination.'3  Its cost, per dollar of coverage, is con-
siderably lower than the cost of industrial insurance,es and the employer pays
149. See VANcE, INsuRA_,cE 44 (3d ed. 1951). New York has the most compre-
hensive statutory regulations of the cost of industrial insurance. Under N. Y. Iiis. LAw
§ 213-a, the expenses incurred in the transaction of industrial insurance cannot exceed a
maximum determined by totaling percentages of all premiums paid by industrial policy-
holders. If an insurer exceeds the statutory limit for more than two years, N. Y. Lis.
LAw § 213-a (9), it may lose its license, or be liquidated. N. Y. Iiis. L, w §§ 40(6), 513,
511(f). The law requires the insurer to fix the agent's compensation in advance. N. Y.
Ixs. LAW, § 213-a(5). It fixes maximum commissions for new business which in effect
equalize the percentages of first year premiums payable as commissions on all forms of
industrial with monthly ordinary, N. Y. INs. LAW §213-a(7). Compensation based on
the volume of new business or the aggregate number of policies sold is prohibited. N. Y.
Ixs. LAw § 213-2(6).
150. The New York legislature, sutpra note 149, missed an opportunity to correct some
basic problems. The statute has no provision designed to reduce or discourage home col-
lections. The statute does not positively encourage sales of monthly ordinary by allowing
payment of a higher sales commission than payable for weekly premium industrial insur-
ance. No steps were taken to reduce lapse by enforcing proper distribution among mem-
bers of the family. Fixing compensation in advance does not deter the agent from en-
couraging home collections since the compensation will likely be based on the size of pre-
miums collected in previous years. Moreover, "compensation" may be interpreted as
meaning merely the fixing of a percentage of premiums collected or a percentage of first
year premiums rather than a salary; if only the percentage need be fixed in advance, the
statute removes no pressure to sell new policies or encourage home collections.
151. LIn= INsu A cE FACT Boon, 20-1 (1950) ; MEnm & OsL.u, MODZMu Li-n INi-
suRAwcE 212-13 (1949).
152. Usually 75 per cent of the employees must be insured if premiums are paid by
employer and employees jointly. Standard Definition of Group Insurance of the National
Convention of Insurance Commissioners, 1917, quoted in ME, & Osr.n, Monm= Im
IxsunAncE 209 (1949). This definition has continued to serve as the basis of group insur-
ance. DAvis at 234.
153. In 1949, group insurance in force amounted to approximately 42 billion dollars in
face value. Lirn INsuRANcE FACT Boon, 20 (1950). In the same year there was almost
32 billion dollars of industrial life insurance in force. Id. at 23.
154. MAcLEAx, Lin IxsuRAicE 361 (1935).
155. PuBuc AYrArs PAYPHLnT No. 134, STmw.&, Bxunaiz Your Own. LwE I:zsur-
AiCE 8 (1947). MfmR & OsLnn, MoDERN Ln I. zsun%,cE 218-19 (1949).
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the premium in whole or in part.5 0 The amount of insurance held by any
individual participant is greater than the average industrial policyholder's
coverage. 157 But group insurance is not widely distributed among low-income
earners in the United States. 5s  Many small plants have no groups. And
non-employed women and children, a large market for industrial, are not
covered. Finally, policies are on a yearly term basis; the insurance lasts
only so long as the insured continues to work in the group.00
The Social Security Act'10 offers an equivalent of industrial life insurance
in lump sum death payments to survivors of eligible workers. Under the
1950 amendment to the Act,1 1 an individual payment benefit may run as
high as 312 dollars. 1 2  While this sum would appear to satisfy the demand
for burial expenses, the estimated average payment under the Act is only 160
dollars.103 Inevitable administrative delay may hold up actual payment for
months. And here again, non-employed women and children are not covered.
Perhaps after many years of operation, social security benefits will cut signifi-
cantly into the industrial insurance market. At present the effect is negligible.
156. Id. at 214.
157. The average group policy has a face value of approximately $1400, calculation
based on table in LIFE INSURANCE FACT BooK 20 (1950), while the average industrial
policy is approximately $300 in face value. Id. at 23.
158. Many statutes require the group policy to cover "not less than twenty-five em-
ployees." E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 73, § 842 (Supp. 1950). Since many of the lower
income wage-earners work in shops and plants of less than twenty-five employees, they
may not be covered by group insurance. Moreover, many states require groups to be
not less than fifty employees. MEHR & OSLER, MODERN LIFE INSURANCE 209 (1949). It
has been estimated that a reduction of the minimum group limit in all states to twenty-
five employees would make group insurance available to approximately 75% more em-
ployers. Id. at 210.
159. MASSACHUSETTS SAVINGS BANK LIFE INSURANCE COUNCIL, CASADY, A BuyER'S
GUIDE TO LIFE INSURANCE 10 (1951). When the employee leaves the group, however,
he may purchase ordinary life insurance from the same insurer in an amount not to
exceed his group coverage. DAvis at 238.
160. 49 STAT. 622 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §402 (i) (Supp. 1951).
161. PUB. L. No. 734, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(a) (August 28, 1950), (42 U.S.C.
§ 402(i) (Supp. 1951). Prior to the 1950 Amendment, lump sum benefits were payable
only where there was no survivor eligible for monthly benefits. Sm. REr. No. 1669,
81st Cong. 2d Sess. 28 (1950). The Amendment removed this condition. Dissatisfaction
with industrial insurance influenced the decision to make lump sum benefits uncondition-
ally available. Cohen, Aspects of Legislative History of the Social Security Act Amend-
ments of 1950, 4 IND. & LAn. REL. REV. 187, 194 (1951).
162. SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, A HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL OLD AGE AND SURVIVORS IN-
SURANcE 81 (1941). The 1950 amendment to the Act does not significantly change the
size of the lump sum death benefit. Under the old Act, the benefit was six times the
primary benefit; under the new Act it is three times the primary benefit, but the primary
benefit has increased enough to make the size of the benefit the same. SEN. REP. No.
1669, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 66 (1950).
163. Id. at 28.
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Savings Bank life insurance"0 is the most attractive alternative to indus-
trial, and potentially its most potent competitor. Sold to any buyer over the
counter at Savings Banks, in any amount and under a variety of plans,2c5 and
protected by the soundness of the banking system, Savings Bank life insurance
is the cheapest protection offered the wage earner.CO Despite low costs,
policies are fair and benefits high. 0 7 But because the advantages of Savings
Bank life insurance are not widely publicized, s it is little used by low-income
groups.0 9 And most important, at present it is available in only three
states.
7 0
In recent years, labor unions have become insurers of their members. The
Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, for example, provides life insurance
benefits of $500 to $1000 to its 300,000 members through a chartered life
164. Savings Bank Life Insurance was created in 1907 by Louis D. Brandeis in
response to criticism of industrial life insurance. See MASON, THE BRAN-DZIS AVAY (1933)
for an historical analysis of its inception. For an e.ahaustive analysis of its structure and
function, see U.S. DEPT. oF LABOR, Buu.nrIN No. 613, OP=RATIo. oF S.vxNGs BANIZr
Lnz INsuRAZ cE iN MAsSACHUsEs and New York (1941).
165. Savings banks may issue whole life, limited payment life, renewable term, and
endowment policies. They may also issue annuity contracts, a combination of life insur-
ance policies and deferred annuity contracts, group insurance, and such other types as
the Insurance Department deems desirable. BULLErN No. 6S, supra note 164, at 17.
166. See Buu.rE No. 638, supra note 164, passim. See table on page 49 supra
for comparative costs of ordinary, industrial and Savings Bank Life Insurance.
167. See chart comparing policy provisions and benefits of the savings banks and ten
insurance companies in Bum.Lr.ix No. 688, supra note 164, at 42-43. The policies contain
no sound health clause. See sample policy on file in Yale Law Library. See also
PuBLIc A w.ns P~AmLEr No. 134, STEwARs, BUING YOUR Owzi Lim INsur.&Ncn
13-17 (1947).
168. For example, N. Y. BANNING LAW, § 269 provides that the banks "shall not
employ solicitors of insurance." Massachusetts and Connecticut have similar no-solicita-
tion rules. The rule, in effect, bars active proselytizing although it permits newspaper
and radio advertisements and brochures. As a result of pressure on the state legislatures
to keep publicity at a minimum, MAsoN, TnE BRAinmIS WAY 260 et scq. (1933), relatively
few persons are sufficiently informed of SBLI to become purchasers. Punuc AF'FA=s
Pzar.= No. 134, STmw.AnT, BUYING. Your OwN LuE Iisuama:cz 17-IS (1947). An
unpublished survey prepared by FAcrs AND FIGUMS for the Massachusetts Savings Ban!-
Life Insurance Council indicated that only half of the lower income groups heard of
SBLL SuRvEy, T. 26 (1949) "[A] large group in the lower income levels remain
relatively untapped." Id. at 5.
169. "[W]orking-class families, for whom the insurance is especially beneficial, have,
for the most part, failed to take advantage of this cheap over-the-counter insurance."
STEwART, op. cit. supra note 167, at 17. But see BuLrrn: No. 69H, supra note 164, at 17:
"ET]he majority of . .. policies are issued to a similar class of buyers [as industrial
insurance buyers]."
170. See note 164 supra. Bills for enablement of Savings Bank insurance have failed
to pass in 13 other states. PuBLIC ArFAms PMPEmr No. 134, SrcwAn,, BUwIn.G Youn
OwN La- INsuDANcE 24 (1947).
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insurance company.171 Premiums are paid wholly by the employer.172 The
company insures almost every one of the union members17a Other unions
purchase group insurance policies for their membership.17 4 While such pro-
grams offer a substitute for industrial insurance, union insurance is still in
an experimental stage.'7 5 Today many unions have no life insurance depart-
ment. And often low-income workers are not members of unions.170
CONCLUSION
High cost and uncertain coverage are the outstanding defects of industrial
life insurance. The enormous expense is primarily traceable to wasteful sell-
ing and premium collection methods and a high lapse rate. Uncertainty of
coverage results from many factors. Because the industrial policyholder is
not medically examined, he may never know whether he qualifies under the
sound health clause in the policy. Moreover, courts may, under a rigid inter-
pretation of the sound health and non-medical treatment clauses, require the
claimant to carry an expensive and often impossible burden of proof. Some
industrial insurers limit or deny recovery if the insured dies of certain diseases.
171. AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMERICA, A STITCH IN TIME 12 (1950).
The size of the benefit depends on the industry in which the worker is employed. Men's
Clothing workers get $500, Store Workers $1000. Id. at 10-11.
Other unions are insurers of their members, e.g., the Distributive, Processing, and
Office Workers Union. Unlike the Amalgamated, the DPO insurance branch is not a
chartered life insurance company but a trust operating under an exemption from the
insurance laws. N.Y. INS. LAW § 466(1). Benefits range from $1000 to $7000 dependitg
on size of weekly earnings and length of service in union shops. TRUSTEES OF TIM 65
SECURrrY PLAN, THE 65 SECURITY PLAN 32 (1951).
172. AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMERICA, A STITCH IN TIME 11 (1950).
173. Ibid.
174. See Hedges, Labor's Interest in Group Insurance, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoD.
94, 95-8 (1935). Cf. Agreement between General Motors Corporation and UAW-CIO,
PENSION PLAN AND INSURANCE PROGRAM 52-3 (1950) (collective bargaining agreement-
employer obligated to establish a self-insured or group insurance plan.)
175. See, e.g., the resolution on a UAW-operated Insurance Company adopted at
the UAW 13th Constitutional Convention, April 1951, instructing the International
Executive Board "to make a comprehensive study of the various aspects of the insurance
problem and the best methods of meeting the needs of our membership. . . ." And sea
statement of President Reuther: "The UAW-CIO has approximately 1,250,000 meni-
bers-this is a large enough group to handle its own insurance on a mutual non-profit
basis and make sizable savings for the workers." Quoted in communication to the
YALE LAW JOURNAL from Harry Becker, Director of the Union's Social Security Depart.
ment, dated April 9, 1951 in Yale Law Library. The Seafarers International Union,
A.F.L., has recently decided to experiment with an insurance plan administered jointly
with the ship operators. N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 23, 1951, p. 28, col. 8.
176. See testimony of Hyman Bookbinder, Economist for the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, Hearings before Subcomittee on Low-Income Families, Joint
Committee on the Economic Report, on Public Law 304, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 540
et seq. (1949).
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